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CLIMATE CHANGE: A NEW REALM OF TORT
LITIGATION, AND HOW TO RECOVER WHEN
THE LITIGATION HEATS UP
Lauren Case*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many U.S. citizens are beginning to feel the negative
effects of climate change, most notably in the form of property
damage resulting from global temperature increases.' One
major effect of an increased global temperature is a rise in
ocean temperatures, amplifying storm intensity and
accelerating glacial melting.' Scientists now agree that
human activity-primarily the burning of fossil fuels-is the
most significant cause of global warming.' Despite the harms
U.S. citizens are facing from greenhouse gas ("GHG")
emissions, the federal government currently does not regulate
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Duke University, 2006. I wish to thank Professor Kenneth Manaster and the
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edits. I also wish to thank my parents, Dan, and Alice who continuously
support and encourage me in all of my endeavors.
1. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency ("EPA"), 549 U.S. 497 (2007);
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); Connecticut v. Am.
Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec.), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed,
79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174); Native Vill. of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). In Massachusetts v.
EPA, plaintiffs sued the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for refusing to
regulate greenhouse gases ("GHGs"), which were contributing to the states' loss
of property from rising sea levels. 549 U.S. 497. Plaintiffs in more recent cases
have sued GHG-emitting corporations for past and future property damages.
Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855; Am. Elec., 582 F.3d 309; Native Vill. of
Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d. 863.
2. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007:
Synthesis Report, at 46 IPCC Plenary XXVII (Nov. 2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdflassessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter
Climate Change Report].
3. Id. at 37-38. The combustion of fossil fuels creates GHGs, which cause
a heating effect in the atmosphere. See id.
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GHGs or provide any recourse for citizens in the form of a
statutory cause of action.4 Remedy seeking plaintiffs have
started to rely on state and federal public nuisance laws as a
cause of action against big carbon dioxide emitters, namely oil
and energy companies.' The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has recently determined that these public nuisance cases are
permissible, holding that the plaintiffs have Article III
standing to bring the case, and that the nuisance claim is a
justiciable question for the courts.' After they survive the
pleading stage, future climate change litigants face a new
dilemma. Climate change plaintiffs are unable to prove that
a particular defendant caused their injuries because of the
impossibility of tracing GHGs back to a specific emitter.'
Part II of this comment examines the causes and effects
of climate change, and analyzes the public nuisance cause of
action, in general and as applied to environmental cases. It
also examines recent federal court decisions regarding
climate change and collective liability theories.' Part III
identifies the problems involving causation and the
apportionment of liability.' Part IV analyzes the relevant
collective liability theories as applied to climate change
defendants.10 Finally, Part V proposes the "commingled
products" theory-a modified market-share liability theory-
4. While there is currently no federal regulation of GHGs, regulations are
likely to appear in the near future. On December 7, 2009, the EPA announced
"that six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public
health and the public welfare of current and future generations."
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496-01 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. chpt. 1). Because GHGs endanger public welfare, the EPA
is obligated to create regulations under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q (2006). This endangerment finding is a result of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHGs are covered by the Clean Air Act,
and that the EPA Administrator is therefore obligated to determine if they are
likely to endanger public health or welfare. 549 U.S. at 528-29 (2007).
5. E.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 869. The plaintiffs in
Native Village of Kivalina sued twenty-four separate oil, energy, and utility
companies. Id.
6. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009),
petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174).
7. GHGs are molecular compounds, each having a generic makeup,
rendering like molecules indistinguishable. Climate Change Report, supra note
2, at 37.
8. See discussion infra Part II.A-D.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
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as the best solution for apportioning liability among climate
change defendants."
II. BACKGROUND: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE RESULTING
LITIGATION
In the United States, climate change is expected to cause
increasingly more damage to real property.' 2 As a result,
litigation has commenced, and an escalation is anticipated as
a result of the recent Second Circuit decision in American
Electric. " Plaintiffs have employed common-law and
statutory torts as an alternative method of getting into court
because of the lack of a statutory cause of action to bring suit
against major emitters of GHGs.11 Tort causes of action have
been found viable in one federal circuit,15 but because no case
has been litigated at trial thus far, there is no indication of
how the courts will approach liability apportionment
problems. These problems are very likely to arise given the
large number of GHG emitters.
A. The Changing Climate and Its Damaging Effects
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA")
acknowledges that "the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal
and oil . . . have caused the concentrations of heat-trapping
'greenhouse gases' to increase significantly in our
atmosphere."' GHGs prevent heat from leaving the earth's
atmosphere, causing a greenhouse effect on earth.17
Scientists agree that human GHG emissions are changing the
earth's atmosphere, and are therefore changing its climate.'"
"Human activities result in emissions of four long-lived
GHGs: [carbon dioxide] CO2, methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
13. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009);
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for
cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174).
14. See, e.g., Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d 855; Am. Elec., 582 F.3d 309; Native Vill.
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
15. Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d at 879-80; Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 392.
16. Climate Change: Basic Information, U.S. ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html#emissions (last visited Sept.
17, 2010).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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(N20) and halocarbons (a group of gases containing fluorine,
chlorine or bromine)."" No matter where these gasses come
from, once released, they "rapidly mix in the atmosphere.""
Each of these gasses has a different impact "on the global
climate system due to their different radiative properties and
lifetimes in the atmosphere."2 1 The emissions of different
GHGs are compared using "CO2 equivalent emissions," a
universal standard based on the "warming influence" of
CO 2.2 2 The observed effects of global warming attributable to
GHGs include "sea level rise, shrinking glaciers, changes in
the range and distribution of plants and animals, trees
blooming earlier, lengthening of growing seasons, ice on
rivers and lakes freezing later and breaking up earlier, and
thawing of permafrost."2 3
1. The Energy Supply: The Primary Source of GHGs
Energy-related activities contribute the largest amount of
GHGs to the atmosphere. 24 1 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (the "IPCC")2 5 found that carbon dioxide is
the most significant anthropogenic GHG, globally
representing 77% of the total GHG emissions in 2004, with
such emissions increasing between 1970 and 2004 by about
80%.26 The largest and fastest growing carbon dioxide
sources in recent years include "energy supply, transport and
industry, while residential and commercial buildings, forestry
19. Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 37.
20. Compl. 11 254, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.
2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 08-1138 SBA).
21. Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 36.
22. Id. CO2 equivalent emission is the amount of CO2 emission that would
cause the same radiative forcing (or warming impact) over time as a specific
amount of another GHG, or a mixture of GHGs. Id. "The equivalent CO 2
emission is obtained by multiplying the emission of a GHG by its Global
Warming Potential (GWP) for the given time horizon. For a mix of GHGs it is
obtained by summing the equivalent CO2 emissions of each gas." Id.
23. Climate Change: Basic Information, supra note 16.
24. See Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 36.
25. The IPCC is a scientific and intergovernmental body established by the
United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological
Organization "to provide the world with a clear scientific view of the current
state of climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic
consequences." INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http-//www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
Scientists from around the world contribute to the IPCC's reports on climate
change. Id.
26. Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 36.
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(including deforestation) and agriculture sectors have been
growing at a lower rate."27 In its 2009 U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Inventory Report, the EPA found that energy-related
activities are the primary source of GHG emissions, totaling
86.3% of the total carbon dioxide emissions for the United
States in 2007.28 Combustion of fossil fuels is the major
source of energy-related emissions, and carbon dioxide is the
primary gas emitted in that process.29 Other energy-related
activities, "such as the production, transmission, storage, and
distribution of fossil fuels, also emit greenhouse gases,"
though in less significant quantities.3 0
2. Climate Change in the United States
In its 2007 Assessment Report, the IPCC drew from a
range of climate models and projected that for the next two
decades there will be a 0.2 0 C increase in global
temperatures. 3 1 This increase will raise both land and ocean
temperatures.32 In a report on climate change impact, the
National Assessment Synthesis Team (NAST) broke down the
impact of climate change by region. 3 The effects of the
increased temperatures include decreased snow cover,
reduction or disappearance of sea ice in the Arctic and
Antarctic, increase in heat waves and precipitation, rise in
sea level, and a likely surge in the intensity of tropical
storms, with storm tracks expected to move poleward." A
rise in sea levels and storm intensity has already caused
damage, encouraging U.S. citizens to seek judicial relief.3 5
27. Id.
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 U.S. GREENHOUSE
GAS INVENTORY REPORT 3-1 (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads09/InventoryUSGhGl99
0-2007.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 45.
32. Id. at 46, 46 fig.3.2.
33. US GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: THE POTENTIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE (Nat'1
Assessment Synthesis Team ed., 2000), available at
http//www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/nationalassessment/overview.htm
(hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS].
34. Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 46-47.
35. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009);
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for
2692011]1
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The global sea level has risen by four to eight inches over
the last one hundred years, adversely impacting U.S. coastal
areas.3 6  "Between 1985 and 1995, southeastern states lost
more than 32,000 acres of coastal salt marsh due to a
combination of human development activities, sea-level rise,
natural subsidence, and erosion."" Additionally, it is
estimated that Louisiana lost about thirty-five square miles
of coastal land per year between 1978 and 1990.38 Future
projected impacts in coastal regions include "the loss of
barrier islands and wetlands, . . . reduced fisheries
productivity, . . . and saltwater intrusion into surface and
ground water supplies."3
In addition, storm intensities have increased as a result
of the warmer Atlantic Ocean temperature, 4 0 and "[o]ne
hurricane modeling study suggests that peak wind speed will
increase by 5-10% by the end of the 21st century."4 1 Further,
"[e]stimates of the cumulative financial effect of a 0.5-meter
rise in sea level on U.S. coastal property by 2100 range from
roughly $20 billion to $150 billion."4 2  In 2005, Hurricane
Katrina alone cost insurance companies $41.1 billion.43 GHG
induced climate change is affecting property, health, and
safety in the United States, and while there are many types
of adverse effects of climate change, damages resulting from
sea level rise and storm intensity have pushed citizens to
pursue tort actions in court."
cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174); Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
36. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, supra note 33, at 80-81.
37. Id. at 51.
38. Id.
39. Id. Barrier islands and wetlands help to protect coastal areas from
storm surges. Id.
40. See Sallie B. Kraus, Are Severe Storms A Harbinger of Climate Change?
The Insurance Industry Begins to Respond, 907 PRACTICING LAW INST., COM.
LAW AND PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 167, 171 (2008).
41. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, supra note 33, at 81.
42. David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based
Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 13 (2003).
43. Kraus, supra note 40, at 171.
44. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009);
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for
cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174); Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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B. Nuisance Law in an Environmental Context
Plaintiffs alleging damages from GHG emissions face
many of the same challenges as plaintiffs in toxic tort cases.
In a toxic tort case, plaintiffs must prove "that they were
exposed to a hazardous level" of a dangerous chemical."
Often these cases are characterized by multiple defendants
and an inability to identify the responsible party." Climate
change litigants have a similar problem; identification among
multiple defendants is difficult given that the chemical
makeup of a specific GHG molecule is indistinguishable from
another. For example, a methane molecule is identical to
all other methane molecules.
Tort causes of action alleged by plaintiffs in toxic tort
cases include nuisance, trespass, negligence, strict liability,
and strict products liability." While a plaintiff suffering
injuries from climate change could pursue any of these causes
of action, this comment focuses on public nuisance because it
has been described as the most promising means of
recovery,4 9 and it is the cause of action most relied on by
litigants in climate change cases thus far.so
1. Public Nuisance Generally
A public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public."" A public nuisance
must affect the community, or a large number of plaintiffs,
and can include interferences such as "loud noises or
45. Wright v. Willamette Indus., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996).
46. Emily H. Damron, Comment, Reviving the Market for Liability Theories:
The "Commingled Product" Theory of Market Share Liability Enters the Judicial
Lexicon, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 505, 505 (2006).
47. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
48. See Ora Fred Harris, Jr., Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation
Element: Is There Any Hope of Reconciliation?, 40 Sw. L.J. 909, 911 (1986).
49. See Grossman, supra note 42, at 52. Public nuisance is distinguished
from private nuisance. Private nuisance involves a substantial interference
with the use and enjoyment of land and affects the enjoyment of private rights
by a single individual, or small group of individuals. Id.
50. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009);
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for
cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174); Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Of these
cases, Murphy Oil is the only case where plaintiffs were seeking remedies under
other tort theories. 585 F.3d at 861.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
2011] 271
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objectionable odors."5 2 Plaintiffs in public nuisance cases are
generally municipalities or other governmental entities." An
interference with a public right can become "unreasonable,"
and therefore actionable, in three ways: 1) if the conduct
involves a significant interference with the public health,
safety, peace, comfort, or convenience; 2) if the conduct is
unlawful; or 3) if the conduct is "of a continuing nature or has
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect [that the] actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the
public right."5 4 Historically, public nuisance law has been
upheld as a means to compensate for harms caused by
pollution.5
2. Public Nuisance in Environmental Cases
Courts have generally recognized a public nuisance
action in environmental cases, specifically those dealing with
air and water pollution." Two Supreme Court cases have
dealt with nuisance in interstate pollution actions."
In an early nuisance case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., the Supreme Court enjoined the Tennessee Copper
Company from discharging sulfur dioxide that was travelling
across state lines and damaging forests, orchards, and crops
in Georgia. 8 The Court held that the noxious fumes were a
common law nuisance and ordered a conditional injunction if
the problem persisted after allowing defendants a reasonable
time to take steps towards stopping the pollution. 9
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), the State
of Illinois asked the Court to enjoin the City of Milwaukee
from discharging raw or inadequately treated sewage and
52. Id. § 821A cmt. b(2).
53. Grossman, supra note 42, at 55. Private citizens can also be plaintiffs,
however, it is more difficult because the class of private citizens who are allowed
recovery is limited to those who have suffered a harm different in kind from the
other members of the public. Id. at 55 n.309 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821C(1) (1979)).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a)-(c).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a)-(c).
ukee 1), 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907).
56. See, e.g., Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. 91; Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230.
57. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91; Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230.
58. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236, 238. Sulfur dioxide converts into
sulfuric acid, a poisonous gas, after mixing with atmospheric moisture. Id.
59. Id. at 239.
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other waste into Lake Michigan." The Court held that
actions regarding pollution of interstate or navigable waters
are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and
emphasized that federal common law exists when dealing
with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was in place at the
time,62 but the Court determined that the Act and the public
nuisance action were not inconsistent; therefore, a nuisance
cause of action was not preempted. However, Congress
subsequently passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972 that established a new, more pervasive, system of
regulation,' and in Milwaukee II the Supreme Court held
that common law nuisance was preempted by the new Act.65
The Court recognized "Congress's intent in enacting the
[19721 amendments was clearly to establish an all-
encompassing program of water pollution regulation," leaving
no room for federal common law.
Plaintiffs seeking damages for climate change actions
have relied on the principles in these environmental nuisance
cases in their attempts to recover damages from alleged
public nuisances caused by GHG emitters.
C. Recent Federal Court Decisions Regarding Climate Change
as a Public Nuisance
In response to the federal government's lack of leadership
in regulating air pollutants affecting climate change, states
and private citizens have started to utilize the courts by
bringing tort actions. Article III of the U.S. Constitution
60. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 92, 93.
61. Id. at 99, 103.
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). This Act is now known as the Clean
Water Act.
63. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 104.
64. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 310-11
(1981).
65. Id. at 317.
66. Id. at 318.
67. See discussion infra Part II.C. If Congress passes a comprehensive law
regulating air pollutants, these types of common law nuisance actions may no
longer be available to plaintiffs after the Court's holding in Milwaukee II. See
supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
68. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009);
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for
cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174); Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobile Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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limits federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and
"controversies,"69 and requires plaintiffs to meet three
requirements to establish standing: 1) they must have
suffered an injury-in-fact; 2) there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct of the
defendant; and 3) it must be likely that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. 0  Whether these
constitutional requirements are met in climate change cases
is creating a split among the federal courts. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that plaintiffs have
standing in climate change actions." The Fifth Circuit
briefly held the same, until the court reinstated the district
court's ruling-that the plaintiffs lacked standing-for
procedural reasons.7 2 Finally, the District Court for the
Northern District of California held that a nuisance cause of
action pertaining to climate change was a nonjusticiable
political question. Therefore, it is unsettled whether a
public nuisance action with respect to climate change satisfies
Article III's cases and controversies requirement, or is a
nonjusticiable political question.74
Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the panel
decision and the Northern District of California's ruling, the
Second Circuit has recognized public nuisance as a legitimate
69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
70. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
71. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 392.
72. On February 26, 2010 the Fifth Circuit vacated its panel opinion by
granting a petition to rehear Comer v. Murphy Oil USA en banc. Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010). Then, on May 28, 2010 the Fifth
Circuit issued an order stating that the en banc court had lost its quorum and
the district court's ruling was reinstated as the court could not "conduct judicial
business" without a quorum. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055
(5th Cir. 2010).
73. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
74. The Supreme Court has not yet dealt with whether a public nuisance
action regarding the effects of climate change is a justiciable controversy.
However, in Massachusetts v. EPA the Court held that under the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006), Massachusetts and eleven other states have
standing to petition the EPA for a review of its refusal to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516-21 (2007). The Court
found that the states had demonstrated each standing requirement noting that
the "EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection" between GHG
emissions and climate change. Id. at 523. While this decision does not deal
specifically with nuisance, it has helped litigants bringing nuisance causes of
action meet the threshold standing requirement of causation. See Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 865 (5th Cir. 2009); Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 333.
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cause of action pertaining to injuries suffered as a result of
climate change. The Second Circuit's decision in American
Electric makes it likely that the Second Circuit will begin to
see an increase in climate change litigation. However, the
defendant power companies have filed a petition for writ of
certiorari . 7 At the time this comment went to print, the
petition had not been granted or denied by the Court. If
certiorari is granted, the circuit split may be resolved to
either permit these causes of action, or not. If certerari is not
granted, the circuit split will remain. For the time being, the
Second Circuit's reversal of the lower court's holding on the
constitutional issues of standing and the political question
doctrine has paved the way for future litigation. Nonetheless,
it should be noted that the dilemmas district courts faced
when deciding these preliminary Article III and political
question issues are at the root of the causation problem that
future litigants and courts will face.
1. The American Electric Decision
In July 2004, eight states and three land trusts filed
complaints against six power companies seeking abatement of
the defendants' contributions to global warming, and alleging
that the companies' actions constituted a public nuisance.7
The states asserted that the defendants were "substantial
contributors to elevated levels of carbon dioxide and global
warming," whose annual emissions equaled "approximately
one quarter of the U.S. electric power sector's carbon dioxide
emissions and approximately ten percent of all carbon dioxide
emissions from human activities in the United States."" The
states further alleged that the defendants' contribution to
global warming unreasonably interfered with public rights,
"including, inter alia, the right to public comfort and safety,
the right to protection of vital natural resources and public
property, and the right to use, enjoy, and preserve the
aesthetic and ecological values of the natural world."o The
75. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 392.
76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No.
10-174 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010).
77. See discussion supra Parts II.C.
78. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 316-18.
79. Id. at 316 (quoting Compl. 1 2).
80. Id. at 352.
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district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss,
determining that the case raised a nonjusticiable political
question under the Baker factors.s" The court further held
that under the third Baker factor, the cause of action was
impossible for a court to decide without making an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly not suited for the
courts. This is because global warming is global in nature
and therefore any policy determination should be made by the
legislature."
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court
after analyzing the Baker factors regarding the political
question, the plaintiffs' standing, the federal common law
nuisance claim, and the displacement of the common law
claim. Contemplating the district court's reliance on the
third Baker factor-the necessity of an initial policy
determination-and the notion that future judicial decisions
relating to climate change may counter the legislature's
refusal to regulate GHGs, the Second Circuit noted that
"Congress's mere refusal to legislate . . . falls far short of an
expression of legislative intent to supplant the existing
common law in that area."' Additionally, the court found the
plaintiffs had standing and had stated a public nuisance
claim upon which relief could be granted. 5 The court closed
its opinion by quoting Milwaukee Is conclusion regarding the
preemption of common law nuisance: "[iut may happen that
new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time
pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But
until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to
81. Id. at 320. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court
"enumerated six factors that may indicate the existence of a non-justiciable
political question." Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 319. The six factors include: 1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; 2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; 3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; 4) the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; 5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or 6) the potential embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. Id. at 321 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
82. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271-74
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
83. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d 309.
84. Id. at 330 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 (1993)).
85. Id. at 333-34.
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appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public
nuisance."" On September 21, 2009, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the district court's
judgment.87 Then on August 2, 2010, the defendant power
companies filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court, but the Court has yet to decide whether or
not to hear the case.
2. The Murphy Oil Decision
Shortly after the Second Circuit's decision in American
Electric, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a similar
case.89  In Comer v. Murphy Oil, land owners along
Mississippi's Gulf Coast brought a class action against oil and
energy companies operating within the United States for the
destruction of their property by Hurricane Katrina."o The
plaintiffs alleged that the intensified effects of Hurricane
Katrina stemmed from the increase in global water and air
temperatures that caused a rise in sea levels.9' The plaintiffs
based their claims on Mississippi common-law causes of
action-including public nuisance-and sought compensatory
and punitive damages9 2 , though notably not an injunction. At
the pleading stage, the district court judge, in a ruling from
the bench, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the
action presented political questions.93
Because the case invoked diversity jurisdiction as well as
state common-law causes of action, the "plaintiffs [needed to]
satisfy both state and federal standing requirements."94 The
defendants challenged the plaintiffs' ability to meet the
causation prong of Article III standing, contending that the
plaintiffs' theory of their injuries was too attenuated and not
86. Id. at 392-93 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406
U.S. 91, 107 (1972)).
87. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d 309.
88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No.
10-174 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010).
89. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
90. Id. at 859
91. Id.
92. Id. at 859-860.
93. Id. at 860 n.2.
94. Id. at 861.
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"fairly traceable" to the oil and power companies actions."
The Fifth Circuit indicated this argument was misplaced and
improperly asked the court to evaluate the merits of the cause
of action prematurely in the litigation." Further, the court
noted that "an indirect causal relationship will suffice," and
that plaintiffs' reliance on scientific reports showing that "a
chain of causation between defendants' substantial emissions
and plaintiffs' injuries" existed, must be accepted as true at
the pleading stage."
The Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA that "accepted as plausible the link
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming."" Citing a climate scientist's report, the Supreme
Court noted "[tihe harms associated with climate change are
serious and well recognized . . . . [R]ising ocean temperatures
may contribute to the ferocity of hurricanes . . . ."" Inferring
that the Supreme Court had accepted a virtually identical
causal connection, the court of appeals dismissed the
defendants' argument with respect to the causation prong. 00
In the district court, the defendants also moved to
dismiss the action on the grounds that the plaintiffs raised a
nonjusticiable political question.10 ' The district court judge
noted that:
[Plaintiffs' complaint asks] this court to do what Baker v.
Carr told me not to do, and that is to balance economic,
environmental, foreign policy, and national security
interests and make an initial policy determination of a
kind which is simply nonjudicial. Adjudication of
Plaintiffs' claims in this case would necessitate the
formulation of standards dictating, for example, the
amount of greenhouse gas emissions that would be
excessive and the scientific and policy reasons behind
those standards. These policy decisions are best left to the
executive and legislative branches of the government, who
are not only in the best position to make those decisions
95. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2009).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 865 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007)).
99. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521-23).
100. Id.
101. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL
6942285, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007).
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but are constitutionally empowered to do so.' 02
The Fifth Circuit strongly disagreed with the district
court, holding that the claims were justiciable because they
"[did] not present any specific question that [was] exclusively
committed by law to the discretion of the legislative or
executive branch."103 The court explained that whether or not
an issue can be "decided by a federal court depends ultimately
on separation of powers, other applicable constitutional
provisions, and federal laws or regulations, not upon federal
judges' capability, intellect, knowledge, expertise or training,
nor upon the inherent difficulty, complexity, novelty or
esotery of the matter to be resolved."'" Moreover, common-
law tort claims like public nuisance are not generally thought
to present nonjusticiable political questions, especially when
the relief sought is limited to damages rather than injunctive
relief. 105
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's holding
with respect to the standing and political question issues, and
remanded the case.106 However, the lower court's holding was
overruled only briefly, because on February 2, 2010-less
than four months later-the Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the
case en banc.'0 7  On May 26, 2010, the Fifth Circuit
announced it had lost its quorum, or majority, and thus could
not decide the case.10 8  The appellate decision had been
vacated; therefore, the district court's opinion was reinstated
by the Fifth Circuit. 0
3. The Native Village of Kivalina Decision
On September 30, 2009, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California granted the
defendants' (twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies)
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in an
action alleging contribution to global warming and the
resulting sea level rise."0 The plaintiffs were the governing
102. Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d at 860 n.2.
103. Id. at 869.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 873-74.
106. Id. at 889-80.
107. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010).
108. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
109. See id. at 1054.
110. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882
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body of the City of Kivalina-an Eskimo village with
approximately four hundred inhabitants-as well as the
Village of Kivalina itself.11' The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant companies' "excessive emission of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases" contributed to global warming
and the melting of the Arctic sea ice around the Kivalina
coast." 2 The sea ice served as protection from storms and as
a result of its erosion and destruction, the villagers would be
forced to relocate."' In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought
relocation damages at an estimated cost of $95 to $400
million.114  The plaintiffs brought four claims: 1) federal
common-law of public nuisance, 2) public and private
nuisance under state law, 3) civil conspiracy, and 4) concert of
action. 11
In ruling on the motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,116 the district court analyzed the
plaintiffs' standing and the political question doctrine."' The
court followed the same reasoning as the district court in
Murphy Oil with regards to standing-that the plaintiffs'
injuries were too attenuated and the court would be making
policy determinations." 8
With regards to the political question issue, the district
court determined that the second and third Baker factors-a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and
the need for an initial policy determination-favored
dismissal of the action.'9 The court reasoned that the focus
of the second Baker factor is not whether the case is
complicated or difficult, but whether a court has "the legal
tools to reach a ruling that is 'principled, rational, and based
upon reasoned distinctions.'"120 The court did not agree with
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
111. Id. at 868.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Compl. $ 1, Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (No.
C 08-1138 SBA)).
115. Id. (citing Compl. 249-282, Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d
863 (No. C 08-1138 SBA)).
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6).
117. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871, 876.
118. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
119. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
120. Id. at 874 (citing Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir.
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the plaintiffs' contention that the standards in a global
warming action are the same as those in any other nuisance
action-an unreasonable interference with public rights-and
emphasized the requirement of balancing "the utility and
benefit of the alleged nuisance against the harm caused." 12 1
The court determined that this required balancing the
benefits of reliable energy resources against the risk that
increasing GHGs would increase the erosion surrounding the
village.12 2 Furthermore, the court contended that there were
no standards to guide a factfinder in rendering a principled,
rational, and reasonable decision in this balancing and in the
resolution of a case such as this. 12 3
The third Baker factor, the requirement of an initial
policy determination, proved equally troubling for the
court.124 The plaintiffs conceded that "virtually everyone on
Earth" contributes to global warming in some minimal way,
but argued that the "[diefendants [were] responsible for a
'substantial portion.'"125 The court determined that "a policy
decision about who should bear the cost of global warming"
[was] not appropriate for the courts. 126
Based on these three cases, it is clear that climate change
litigation can proceed in the Second Circuit, while in the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits there is still no clear answer for injured
plaintiffs. Notably, all three district courts struggled with the
plaintiffs' ability to prove causation, and the determination of
an appropriate method for apportioning liability when a
defendant cannot be identified.12 7  The standing problem
addressed by each court pertained only to causation.128 In
contrast, the political question concerns of each court were
rooted in the difficulty of apportioning liability and the
perceived policy determination that accompanies the task of
apportionment. 129
2005)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 874-75.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 876.
125. Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877
(2009).
126. Id. at 876-77.
127. See discussion supra Parts II.C.
128. See discussion supra Parts II.C.
129. See discussion supra Parts I.C.
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D. Collective Liability and Apportionment of Damages in
Toxic Tort Cases
When multiple actors contribute to an injury-as is the
case with climate change injuries 3 0 -the question becomes
what is "the amount of damages for which the defendants
collectively and individually should be held liable."a13
Assigning liability where it is difficult or impossible to trace
the harm back to a particular defendant has been
encountered in tort and environmental litigation before, most
notably in toxic tort litigation.'3 2
Toxic tort cases present the difficult problem of
identifying the party who caused the plaintiffs injury because
the injuries are commonly dormant for a long period of time
before they manifest themselves. 13 3  Thus, there is
uncertainty regarding the effects of exposure to toxins upon
humans, and it is often difficult to trace pollutants back to a
specific polluter. 134 It is contrary to public policy, however, to
prohibit a plaintiff from recovery only because the nearly
impossible burden of proving the cause of injury rests entirely
on his shoulders.'3 5  Consequently, the collective liability
theories traditionally used in products liability cases,136 can
be implemented to shift some of the burden onto the
defendants to prove they have not caused the injury.3 7 The
most relevant collective liability theories for climate change
cases are discussed below and include: enterprise liability
theory, concert of action theory, and market share theory.'3 8
130. See Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 36. Energy, transportation,
and industrial companies are the leading GHG emitters. Id. These sectors
combined comprise an astounding number of companies.
131. Grossman, supra note 42, at 31.
132. Harris, supra note 48, at 909.
133. Id. at 928.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 930.
136. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (exploding blasting cap belonging to unknown manufacturer
injured plaintiffs).
137. Harris, supra note 48, at 930.
138. Another collective liability theory, "alternative liability," is potentially
available, but is less suited to climate change cases because it applies to
situations where only one defendant has actually caused harm. Poole v. Alpha
Therapeutic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 351, 354-55 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
282 [Vol:51
CLIMATE CHANGE
1. Enterprise Liability Theory
One collective liability theory available to plaintiffs who
struggle with causation as a result of their inability to
identify the defendant is enterprise liability.139 This theory is
used to hold all manufacturers in a given industry liable
when they jointly control the risk of harm, but when the
plaintiffs cannot identify whose product caused the specific
harm. 40  In Hall v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,141 the
court established enterprise liability theory to allow recovery
for plaintiffs injured by exploding blasting caps, but who
could not identify the manufacturer of the injury-causing
caps.' 42  The manufacturers of the caps were implementing
an industry-imposed safety standard that was in fact leading
to the injuries rather than promoting safety and therefore
each defendant had contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries.14 3
The basis for enterprise liability theory, as established in
Hall, is industry-wide control over the risk. Therefore, the
theory is limited to "those situations not involving a large
number of companies in the particular industry," otherwise,
the necessary inference that the companies controlled the risk
is less likely.'" Thus far, courts have not specifically used
enterprise liability theory in environmental tort cases, and
have expressly rejected it as incompatible with DES cases,145
because of the large number of companies in that industry. 4 1
2. Concert of Action Theory
An alternative collective liability theory-the concert of
action theory-stems from the common law rule that "if two
or more defendants act pursuant to a common design, each
[defendant] is entirely liable for the tort actually committed
by another."147 The theory requires an agreement, express or
139. Harris, supra note 48, at 936.
140. E.g., Hall, 345 F. Supp. 353.
141. Id.
142. Harris, supra note 48, at 937.
143. Id. (citing Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 47 (Wis. 1984)).
144. Id. at 937 & 937 n.207 (citing Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378).
145. DES was a drug given to women to help prevent miscarriages. Its
negative effects manifested years later, causing cancer in the offspring of the
women who took the drug. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 184 (N.Y.
1982).
146. Harris, supra note 48, at 937 & 937 n.209.
147. Id. at 932 & 932 n.172 (citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF
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implied, between the defendants. 14 8
An example of the concert of action theory is illustrated
in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.' The causation problem
presented in Bichler was the inability to identify the
responsible defendant, where the plaintiffs cervical and
vaginal cancer allegedly developed as a result of her mother's
ingestion of DES while pregnant with the plaintiff.so The
primary issue in the case was whether Eli Lilly could be held
liable when numerous other companies developed and
distributed DES, and it was virtually impossible for Ms.
Bichler to prove Eli Lilly had manufactured the particular
DES that her mother had consumed.' 5' To ease the causation
burden, the court used the concert of action theory,
characterizing the drug manufacturers' conduct as "conscious
parallelism," which supported a finding that the companies
impliedly agreed to manufacture the drug without first
testing it,'52 "making any of the manufacturers liable for the
plaintiffs entire damages despite the plaintiffs inability to
identify the manufacturer of the drug."' Therefore, Ms.
Bichler could select any manufacturer found to be in concert
of action and recover solely from that manufacturer.15 4
The concert of action theory was also successfully applied
to lead-based paint manufacturers. Plaintiffs were injured
after the paint manufacturers and their trade organization
fraudulently misrepresented the safety of the paint in their
marketing, and concealed any knowledge of the paint's
hazardous qualities.' 5
Courts have declined to apply the concert of action theory
in certain circumstances. Most notably where a state has not
adopted it for policy reasons, 56 and where, based on the facts
THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (5th ed. 1984)).
148. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989).
149. Bichler, 436 N.E.2d 182. Concert of action theory is no longer used in
DES cases in New York because the New York Court of Appeals held that
market share theory is the appropriate theory for DES cases. Hymowitz, 539
N.E.2d at 1072.
150. Bichler, 436 N.E.2d at 184.
151. Harris, supra note 48, at 932.
152. See Bichler, 436 N.E.2d at 188.
153. Harris, supra note 48, at 933.
154. Id.
155. See City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 597 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993).
156. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 249789, at
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of the case, when there is no evidence of an express or tacit
agreement, or a common plan to commit a tort. 57
3. Market Share Liability Theory
Market Share liability theory, first recognized in Sindell
v. Abbot Laboratories, is another collective liability theory
that courts may apply when an innocent plaintiff cannot
prove the identity of the negligent defendant whose product
caused the injury.' 8 In the situation where the plaintiff can
prove every element of her claim except the identification of
the defendant and has "joined potential tortfeasors
representing a 'substantial share' of the product market," the
burden of identification shifts to the defendants to prove that
they are not the responsible parties, and the court will hold
each defendant severally liable for a percentage of the
judgment equal to the percentage that represents the
defendant's share of the market at the time of the injury.'59
In Sindell, the court "based its decision on two policy
considerations: (1) 'as between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the
injury'; and (2) holding manufacturers liable would create an
incentive to produce safer products."6 o In determining
whether market share liability should be adopted in a
particular case, the Restatement (Third) of Torts advises
courts to consider the following factors:
(1) the generic [or fungible] nature of the product; (2) the
long latency period of the harm; (3) the inability of
plaintiffs to discover which defendant's product caused
plaintiffs harm, even after exhaustive discovery; (4) the
clarity of the causal connection between the defective
product and the harm suffered by plaintiffs; (5) the
absence of other medical or environmental factors that
could have caused or materially contributed to the harm;
and (6) the availability of sufficient "market share" data to
support a reasonable apportionment of liability.' 6 '
*3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 1991).
157. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989).
158. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
159. Damron, supra note 46, at 511 (citing Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-37).
160. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 348, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936).
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 15 cmt. c
(1998).
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None of these factors are dispositive in determining
liability. 162
In Sindell, eleven pharmaceutical companies were sued
for injuries resulting from their manufacturing of DES, and
the cancer it caused to women exposed to the drug in utero. "I
The California Supreme Court found existing liability
theories inadequate to properly apportion liability amongst
the defendants, and thus adopted the market share theory.1
Other states have since adopted the market share theory for
DES cases as well.'6 5
In contrast to DES cases, most courts decline to use
market share liability for application in asbestos cases
because of the nonfungibility of asbestos fibers.1 66  Unlike
DES, "asbestos fibers are of several varieties, used in varying
quantities in the various products that contain asbestos, and
each is different in its harmful effect."' 6 7 One district court
has noted that while none of the factors listed in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts is dispositive, "great weight
should be given to factor [one] because . .. the fungible nature
of goods creates the necessity for using the market share
theory and ensures fairness in apportioning liability."6
4. The Commingled Product Theory as a Modification of
the Market Share Liability
The commingled product theory, a slight modification of
market share liability theory, emerged in 2005.16e In MTBE
Products Liability Litigation, the plaintiff municipalities and
water providers alleged that the defendants, multiple
gasoline producers, manufactured and distributed the
gasoline additive MTBE, and that the additive had
contaminated their ground water.170 "MTBE is [a] chemical
162. MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
163. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925.
164. Id. at 936-37.
165. See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982); Martin
v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wash. 2d 581 (Wash. 1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342
N.W.2d 37, 47 (Wis. 1984).
166. White v. Celotex Corp., 907 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1990).
167. Id. (quoting In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D.
Cal. 1982)).
168. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 348, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
169. See MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348.
170. Id. at 361.
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compound produced from methanol and isobutylene, a
byproduct of the gasoline refining process," and it has no
"chemical signature" that would allow it to be traced back to a
particular gasoline manufacturer.171 Under the commingled
product theory,
[w]hen a plaintiff can prove that certain gaseous or liquid
products . . . of many suppliers were present in a
completely commingled or blended state at the time and
place that the risk of harm occurred, and the commingled
product caused a single indivisible injury, then each of the
products should be deemed to have caused the harm.172
In constructing the theory, the court determined that
courts may make a policy decision to implement new liability
theories when "it would be inappropriate to foreclose
plaintiffs entirely from seeking relief merely because their
actions did not fit the parameters of existing liability
theories."'73 The court noted that the "MTBE cases suggest
the need for one more theory, which can be viewed as a
modification of market share liability, incorporating elements
of concurrent wrongdoing." 7 4
In MTBE Products Liability Litigation, the district court
illustrated a commingled product situation by giving an
example pertaining to petroleum:
the petroleum products of ten refiners are commingled in
an underground storage tank. These ten products are
completely fungible and blended, combined or commingled
into a single batch. Each refiner supplied ten percent of
the total volume of product in the tank. If twenty percent
of the petroleum in the tank leaks into the ground, it is
not reasonable to assume that the harm resulting from
this leak was caused by the products of only two refiners
(each supplying ten percent), and to require plaintiffs to
prove which two proximately caused the harm. Because
the petroleum products were commingled to form a new
mixture, each of the ten refiners contributed to the injury
in proportion to the amount of product that each
supplied. 17
171. Id. at 364-65.
172. Id. at 377-78.
173. Id. at 377.
174. Id.
175. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 348, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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The commingled product theory allows plaintiffs to recover
when there is both concurrent wrongdoing by multiple
defendants, and an inability to identify a particular
defendant as the specific wrongdoer.'
The effects of climate change have led to an interesting
new type of litigation, and the recent decisions regarding the
justiciability of these cases will create novel liability issues
for courts to navigate. The remainder of this comment will
discuss these issues.
III. THE PROBLEM OF APPORTIONING LIABILITY AMONG
CLIMATE CHANGE DEFENDANTS
It is generally accepted that the burning of fossil fuels
has increased concentrations of GHGs in the earth's
atmosphere, causing global temperatures to increase.' 7 7 The
resulting effects-such as increased storm intensities-have
allegedly begun to cause injuries in the United States. 78 As
there is currently no statutory cause of action to pursue, 179
plaintiffs are beginning to seek relief under public nuisance
theories.18 0 The viability of such a cause of action has been
tested and upheld in the Second Circuit,' 8  and because
federal common-law nuisance is a generally accepted theory
in toxic tort cases,'8 2 more litigation is likely to follow.
Because climate change litigation is in its infancy, the
discussion of apportioning liability has not yet been
thoroughly explored. Yet the problems associated with
proving causation and apportioning liability seem to be the
primary cause for concern in the district courts,'8 3 and as a
result of the impossibility of tracing carbon dioxide from a
defendant source, courts hearing future climate change cases
will struggle to determine which defendant has caused the
176. See id.
177. Climate Change: Basic Information, supra note 16.
178. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
179. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
180. See Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d 855; Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582
F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2,
2010) (No. 10-174); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.
2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
181. Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d at 879-80; Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 392.
182. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
183. See supra text accompanying note 125.
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harm. '8 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
determined that the cause of action is justiciable.'a
Therefore, assuming the Supreme Court does not grant
certiorari and overturn this decision, district courts, in at
least the Second Circuit, will be faced with the apportionment
of liability problem in the near future.
IV. PROVIDING A REMEDY FOR INNOCENT PLAINTIFFS WHEN
THE DEFENDANT IS UNIDENTIFIABLE
As the preliminary issues-standing and a nonjusticiable
political question-have been settled, a district court in the
Second Circuit will now have to decide the remanded
American Electric case,'8 6 and the circuit's district courts will
likely be faced with a plethora of similar cases in the near
future-assuming the Supreme Court will not overrule
American Electric. Plaintiffs in the remanded case will have
to prove that the nuisance was caused by the defendants and
that it is unreasonable, 8 7 and if they can, the trial court will
have to apportion liability. First, this section will analyze the
inability to prove who caused the harm, with respect to GHG
emissions, and second, it will analyze the most reasonable
and just way to apportion liability in a climate change case
when multiple, unidentifiable defendants are at fault.
A. The Inability to Prove Who Caused Harm
The global scientific community and the EPA recognize
that the significant amounts of GHGs in the atmosphere are
the result of anthropogenic activity, namely, the burning of
fossil fuels. 8 8 Even the Supreme Court has recognized the
causal connection between man-made GHG emissions and
global warming. 8 1
Nevertheless, it is impossible for courts to trace carbon
dioxide, or any other GHG, back to a specific polluter for a
number of reasons.' 90 First, GHGs, once released, "rapidly
184. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
185. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d 309.
186. Id.
187. An unreasonable interference is an element of the public nuisance
action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a)-(c).
188. Climate Change: Basic Information, supra note 16.
189. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007).
190. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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mix in the atmosphere" and increase worldwide
concentrations, 191 as opposed to pollutants released into a
river for example, where the potential sources are likely
limited to sources near the river. Second, a carbon dioxide
molecule's composition is identical to every other carbon
dioxide molecule, as are the other GHG molecules,19 2 and
there is no way to differentiate individual molecules and
track them back to their source. Lastly, identifying a specific
defendant as the cause of harm will be difficult because the
effects of climate change involve fluctuations in an extant
climate system that is very complex, as opposed to the
creation of a new harm, like the specific cancer DES
causes.1' Because there are so many factors other than
GHGs that cause the climate to fluctuate, it is difficult to
show that any particular defendant caused or intensified a
particular climate event.' 94
However, it is relatively easy to determine the total
amount in tons of carbon dioxide and other GHGs a
corporation emits and the percentage of total GHG emissions
they contribute to the atmosphere.'9 5  Therefore, it is not
surprising that plaintiffs in climate change actions thus far
have elected to join the contributing corporations who emit
the largest quantities of GHGs as defendants. 9 6
B. Collective Liability Theories Applied to Climate Change
Cases
Climate change plaintiffs in recent cases have alleged
that they have suffered property damages and that they will
suffer similar damages in the future as a result of increased
air and water temperatures.197 Future plaintiffs will likely do
the same. In the event that plaintiffs would win their cases
but for the inability to identify a particular defendant, courts
191. Compl. 254, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.
2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 08-1138 SBA).
192. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
193. Grossman, supra note 42, at 24.
194. Id.
195. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir.
2009), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174)
(identifying the percentage of emissions the defendant corporations contribute).
196. See, e.g., id.
197. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 867 (5th Cir. 2009); Am. Elec.,
582 F.3d at 317.
290 [Vol:51
CLIMATE CHANGE
can, and should, make policy determinations allowing
alternate forms of liability when "it would be inappropriate to
foreclose plaintiffs entirely from seeking relief," simply
because no liability theory exists.s98 While GHGs are not a
traditional "product," like DES, they are a byproduct of fossil
fuels, and the policies that support collective liability theories
in toxic tort cases apply equally to climate change cases. In
this section, the recognized collective liability theories
discussed in Part III.D will be examined in relation to their
compatibility with climate change litigation.
1. Enterprise Liability Theory in the Climate Change
Context
Enterprise liability theory is not well suited for climate
change litigation. The basis of enterprise liability theory is
industry-wide control over the risk of injury. 99 The largest
emitters of GHGs do not have industry-wide control over the
total level of emission, since many different industries emit
substantial amounts of GHGs.200 Furthermore, the Hall
decision limits the applicability of enterprise liability to
situations where there are only a few companies in a
particular industry.2 01 Emitters of carbon dioxide and other
GHGs span multiple industries, with the most significant
emitters in the energy, transportation and industry sectors.202
Because there are multiple industries involved and the
number of companies within those industries is large, the
necessary inference-industry-wide control over the risk of
releasing GHGs-cannot be made. Therefore, enterprise
liability is incompatible with climate change litigation.
Moreover, courts have not yet recognized this theory as
applicable to environmental cases, 203  and are likely
disinclined to do so for the reasons mentioned.
198. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 348, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
199. Harris, supra note 48, at 937 & 937 n.207.
200. Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 36.
201. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y
1972).
202. Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 36.
203. Harris, supra note 48, at 937.
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2. Concert ofAction Theory in the Climate Change
Context
The concert of action theory may be applicable to climate
change cases. One advantage of being able to apply the
concert of action theory in a climate change case is that a
plaintiff who is unable to identify a particular defendant can
recover from a single named defendant.204 Even so, plaintiffs
will face problems if they cannot prove some express
agreement amongst the defendants.2 0 5
Climate change litigants share commonalities with the
plaintiff in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., the model concert of
action case.20 6 In Bichler, Eli Lilly was held liable under the
concert of action theory because the companies that
manufactured the DES that was considered to be a defective
uniform product were found to have impliedly agreed to
manufacture the drug without testing it.20 7 The court found
that any DES manufacturer could be held liable in this
situation, despite the plaintiffs inability to prove specific
causation.20 8 Similarly, in a climate change scenario,
plaintiffs may be able to argue that the principal emitters
have impliedly agreed to be unreasonable in continuing to
emit such large quantities of GHGs without any precautions.
Therefore, any GHG emitter could be held liable for the entire
amount of damages in a given lawsuit.
If plaintiffs rely on this theory, they must come to court
prepared with solid evidence tending to show an agreement,
express or implied, amongst GHG emitters. The New York
Court of Appeals, in a DES case after Bichler, abandoned the
concert of action doctrine for DES cases, because there was
nothing in the record to show any agreement, and "[p]arallel
activity, without more, is insufficient to establish the
agreement element necessary to maintain a concerted action
claim."209 If plaintiffs can prove GHG emitters are making
fraudulent misrepresentations or concealing knowledge of
harm, it may be enough for a court to apply the theory to
204. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
205. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989).
206. Harris, supra note 48, at 932.
207. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982).
208. Id.
209. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75.
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climate change defendants.2 1 0
Because of the requirement that defendants expressly or
tacitly agree to participate in a plan to commit a tortious act,
this theory will prove difficult for plaintiffs to advocate
without substantial proof of some such agreement. Therefore,
while the concert of action theory can be presented by
plaintiffs as an alternative to traditional causation, it should
not be the only alternative theory relied upon because a court
may decline to apply it.
3. Market Share Liability Theory in the Climate Change
Context
Market share liability theory is perhaps the best
collective liability theory for plaintiffs in climate change
cases. In cases filed thus far, plaintiffs have "joined potential
tortfeasors representing a 'substantial share' of the
market."2 1 1 In accordance with public policy, once this occurs,
the burden of identification will shift to the defendants to
prove that they are not the responsible party.212
Furthermore, of the six factors suggested for
consideration in deciding whether market share theory
should be adopted in a particular case, factors one, two, three,
and six all apply directly to climate change cases.2 13 Factor
one applies because carbon dioxide and other GHGs are
fungible, or generic in nature.214 Factor two applies because
there is a latency period in the harm as GHGs buildup over
time.1 5 Factor three applies because plaintiffs cannot
discover which defendant's emissions caused their harm.2 1 6
Finally, factor six applies because there is data available to
apportion liability based on a defendant's share of the
market. 2 17 Factors four and five- the "clarity of the causal
210. See City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 597 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993).
211. Damron, supra note 46, at 511; see, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power
Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092
(U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174).
212. Harris, supra note 48, at 930.
213. See supra text accompanying note 161 (listing the six factors provided
by the Restatement).
214. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
215. See discussion supra Part II.A.
216. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
217. See, e.g., Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 316 (alleging defendants emit one
quarter of the U.S. electrical sector's total carbon dioxide emissions).
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connection" and the "absence of other medical or
environmental factors"2 18-may be more difficult to
evaluate.21 9 In MTBE Products Liability Litigation, the
district court noted that the most weight should be given to
factor one because "the fungible nature of goods creates the
necessity for using the market share theory and ensures
fairness in apportioning liability." 220 Because the majority of
these factors apply to carbon dioxide and other GHG
emissions, the theory is applicable in climate change cases.
Moreover, the policy behind market share theory is
important in the climate change context because there are
innocent plaintiffs and guilty defendants who require
incentives to change. In Sindell, the court reasoned that
innocent plaintiffs should prevail over negligent defendants,
and that liability will provide an incentive to produce safer
products. 221 The same policy argument applies here. In a
climate change nuisance case, if the defendants are found to
be unreasonably interfering with a public right by increasing
air and water temperatures,22 2 the innocent plaintiff, whose
property has been destroyed can prevail. In addition to
allowing the plaintiff to recover, incentives are created for oil
and energy producers to take more precautions with their
emissions. The theory is fair because defendants will be held
severally liable for only the percentage of the judgment that
represents each defendant's share of the market at the time
of the injury.2 23 With the large number of significant
emitters, all contributing to the warming effect, it is
reasonable to divide liability amongst defendants in
proportion to market share.2 24
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 15 cmt. c
(1998).
219. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
220. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 348, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
221. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
222. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. A public nuisance is an unreasonable
interference with a right held common to the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
223. Damron, supra note 46, at 511.
224. Defining the "market" in a climate change case may prove challenging
as there are countless GHG emitters, including individuals. One proposal is to
define the "market" as encompassing all the industries to which the defendant
companies belong.
294 [Vol:51
CLIMATE CHANGE
4. Climate Change Litigation Compared to MTBE
Litigation, and the Applicability of the
Commingled Product Theory
GHGs are comparable to MTBE and therefore the
justifications for applying the commingled products theory to
MTBE cases translates directly to climate change cases.
GHGs are the byproduct of burning fossil fuels, and similarly,
MTBE is the byproduct of the gasoline refining process.2 25
Carbon dioxide and other GHGs can be applied to this
liability model as "commingled products." Once emitted as a
result of fossil fuel combustion, the GHG molecules enter the
atmosphere, becoming comingled, and their increasing
concentrations cause the heat-trapping greenhouse effect that
leads to global warming.22 6 Since each large GHG emitter's
byproducts are in the atmosphere, each has effectively
contributed to a plaintiffs injuries caused by global warming.
The theory is like market share liability in that it holds
defendants severally liable. However, it differs from
traditional market share liability because the "defendants'
products were actually present and contributed to the
injury, "22 exactly like GHGs' presence in the atmosphere and
contribution to global warming and its associated harms.
Market share liability and the modified market share
liability theory of "commingled products" are well suited for
use in apportioning liability in climate change cases. Concert
of action theory may be applicable with proof of an express
agreement to act unreasonably, while enterprise liability
theory should not be applied based on the lack of industry-
wide control over GHGs.
V. MARKET SHARE LIABILITY SHOULD BE APPLIED IN CLIMATE
CHANGE CASES
Public nuisance and other common law tort actions
pertaining to climate change are likely to escalate in the near
future as a result of the recent decision in the Second
Circuit,2 28 so long as it is not overruled by the Supreme Court.
Because of the impossibility of identifying which defendant
225. MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 364.
226. Climate Change: Basic Information, supra note 16.
227. MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
228. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
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caused climate related harms, a collective liability theory
should be used in support of the policy that innocent plaintiffs
should be able to recover for their injuries. 2 2 9  Given this
policy and the characteristics of the injurious gases, the
modified market share theory of "commingled products" is
best suited for application in climate change cases.
A. GHGs Cannot be Traced to Their Producer
Because carbon dioxide and other GHGs are the
byproducts of burning fossil fuels-each with its own generic
chemical structure-it is impossible to trace those molecules
back to any particular fuel or energy producer.2 30 Yet,
climate scientists agree that burning fossil fuels has caused
global warming, the effects of which have caused substantial
property damage.2 3 ' Since multiple actors have contributed
to the harms associated with global warming, like the melting
of sea ice and intensification of storms,2 32 a cumulative
liability theory should be adopted by the courts in support of
the policy that proven wrongdoers should not be able to
"escape liability merely because the nature of their conduct
and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to
prove which of them caused the harm."
B. The Commingled Products Theory is the Best
Apportionment Option for Climate Change Cases
Holding major polluters severally liable is the fairest way
to apportion liability in the climate change context, and the
"commingled product" theory of market share liability is the
best suited of the collective liability theories for dealing with
the unique characteristics of GHGs.23 4 GHGs, like the
gasoline additive MTBE, are commingled and combined when
the injury is committed,"' meaning "defendants' products
were actually present and contributed to the injury. "236
229. MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377; see supra note 7.
230. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
231. See discussion supra Part II.A.
232. See discussion supra Part II.
233. MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 373 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(b)3 cmt. f (1979)). The court is specifically discussing
the policy attributed to alternative liability. Id.
234. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
235. Id.
236. MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
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GHGs are blended into a "single batch," exactly like the
petroleum products in the example given by the district court
in MTBE Products Liability Litigation.23 7 While GHGs are
not all uniform, CO 2 equivalent emissions allow GHGs to be
compared to reflect each type of GHG's warming potential.23 8
Furthermore, the policy considerations discussed in
MTBE Products Liability Litigation and Sindell support an
application of the market share theory. These policy
considerations focus toward two distinct goals: first "as
between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of the injury," and second "holding
manufacturers liable would create an incentive to produce
safer products." 23 9 These goals are both important to climate
change plaintiffs and to society as a whole. The plaintiffs are
innocent and deserve to recover, while the defendants will be
incentivized to reduce emissions and the risk of future
injuries to society.
VI. CONCLUSION
Global warming is being caused by the increasing
amount of GHGs humans emit into the atmosphere, 2 4 0 and
the damage to real property is expected to increase as global
temperatures continue to rise. 24' The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has ruled that public nuisance is a viable cause of
action for plaintiffs seeking relief from major emitters of
GHGs,24 2 and an escalation in litigation on the subject is
likely if the Supreme Court upholds this ruling. However, the
fungible nature of GHGs makes it impossible to prove any
specific actor caused the global warming that led to plaintiffs'
harm. 243  Assuming innocent plaintiffs can prove each
element of their claims, courts must find a way to apportion
liability amongst defendants. The commingled product
theory of market share liability is best suited for this task,
given the nature of GHGs, the products causing harm, and
237. Id.
238. Climate Change Report, supra note 2, at 36.
239. MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 375 (citing Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980)).
240. See discussion supra Part II.A.
241. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
242. See discussion supra Part II.C.
243. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part
IV.A.
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the associated public policy interests. 2 " Because of the
difficulty courts will have in determining who is at fault in
climate change cases, dividing the defendant's share of the
market at the time of injury is the most reasonable and fair
way to provide recovery for innocent plaintiffs.
244. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
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